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Although market transactions for technologies, ideas, knowledge or information are
limited by several well-known imperfections, there is evidence that they have become more
common than in the past. In this paper we analyze how the presence of markets for
technology conditions the technology and corporate strategy of firms. The first and most
obvious implication is that markets for technology increase the strategy space: firms can
choose to license in the technology instead of developing it in-house or they can choose to
license out their technology instead of (or in addition to) investing in the downstream
assets needed to manufacture and commercialize the goods. The implications for
management include more proactive management of intellectual property, greater
attention to external monitoring of technologies, and organizational changes to support
technology licensing, joint-ventures and acquisition of external technology. For
entrepreneurial startups, markets for technology make a focused business model more
attractive. At the industry level, markets for technology may lower barriers to entry and
increase competition, with important implications for the firms’ broader strategy as well.
1. Introduction
German chemical companies are thought to have pioneered the institu-
tionalization of in-house R&D early in the 20th century, an organizational
innovation that was rapidly adopted by leading firms in technology-based
industries all over the world (Beer, 1959; Chandler, 1990). This model of
organizing innovation, where R&D and the complementary assets required
for innovation are integrated inside the firm, has emerged as the dominant
paradigm for many decades. Indeed, it has been held up as a part of the recipe
















































419for lasting commercial success (e.g. Chandler, 1990). The theoretical
underpinnings of this model have been examined by several authors. For
instance, Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that the development of
technology and innovations is based on organizational routines which are
difficult to transfer across organizational boundaries. Relatedly, Teece (1988)
has highlighted the transaction costs involved in transferring knowledge and
technological information through arm’s length market-mediated contracts.
However, in the past two decades or so there has been a rapid growth in a
variety of arrangements for the exchange of technologies or technological
services, ranging from R&D joint ventures and partnerships, to licensing and
cross-licensing agreements, to contract R&D. Although we lack compre-
hensive empirical measures over time, all the available evidence suggests that
the trade in technologies has become more common than in the past (see
Section 2). Recent studies have documented an increase in licensing revenues
earned by US firms (Dengan, 1998) and the upsurge in patenting activities,
possibly reflecting the increased opportunities for technology licensing (Hall
and Ham, 1999; Kortum and Lerner, 1999). Teece himself has recently noted
that under certain conditions trade in technologies is possible and likely
(Grindley and Teece, 1997; Teece, 1998). In short, markets for technology are
emerging and developing in several high-tech industries.1
The growth and functioning of markets for technology might be limited
by several factors, most notably the tacit and context-specific nature of
technological knowledge.2 However, it is undeniable that when markets for
technology exist they have major implications for firms’ corporate strategies.
The analysis of such implications is the main goal of this paper.
Markets for technology affect the role of companies both as technology
users (they can ‘buy’ technologies) and as technology suppliers (they can ‘sell’
1 This sharp distinction between markets and organizations which is made primarily for expository
reasons is not completely faithful to history. Indeed, Chandler (1990) provides several examples of firms
that within the in-house R&D paradigm have relied on external sources of knowledge. A classic reference
is the reliance of DuPont on external technology until the 1930s (Hounshell and Smith, 1988). There are
also important differences across sectors and countries. For instance, during the 1950s and the 1960s
Japanese firms in the machinery construction and chemical industries were heavily licensing technologies,
mainly from the USA (Chandler, 1990).
2 Elsewhere (see Arora et al., 2001a) we study the nature and functioning of markets for technology and
the factors which limit or encourage their growth (see also Pavitt, 2000). We also discuss in detail how the
actions of firms, particularly early in their history, have affected the evolution of markets for technology.
Sometimes companies have helped, possibly not intentionally, to develop markets for technology. For
instance, this is the case of oil companies that, with their early reliance on external technological services
and refining technology, have promoted the rise of specialized suppliers (Arora and Gambardella, 1998).
In other industries regulation and anti-trust policy have played a major role, as for instance in technology
licensing by AT&T and IBM (Grindley and Teece, 1997). Although we acknowledge the importance of
these issues, the scope of the present paper is already too broad to analyze them here.
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space: firms can choose to license in the technology instead of developing it
in-house; firms can choose to license out the technology instead of (or in
addition to) investing in the downstream assets needed to manufacture and
commercialize the goods. Thus, for example, entrepreneurial start-ups may
be able to focus more narrowly on developing technology rather than on its
application, by relying on licensing and other arrangements to appropri-
ate the returns on their innovative efforts. Given that manufacturing and
commercialization require substantial resources, which smaller firms may be
unable to mobilize, markets for technology may be critical for the very exist-
ence of high-tech start-ups. For technology users monitoring of externally
available technologies becomes a strategic imperative, although external and
internal research need not be mutually exclusive options. Moreover, markets
for technology can undermine privileged access to technology that incumbent
firms in an industry may enjoy, because competitors and entrants may acquire
the technology from alternative sources of supply in the market. At the
industry level markets for technology lower entry barriers, increase com-
petition and compress product life cycles: all changes that require appropriate
strategic responses.
This paper contributes to the literature on strategic management of
technology. David Teece’s seminal paper pointed out that if a firm cannot
appropriate rents from innovation through licensing (‘weak appropriability’)
in order to profit from the technology, the firm should acquire assets that are
co-specialized with the innovation (Teece, 1986). Pisano (1990) argues that
new product development is more likely to be internalized in those areas
where the (external) R&D market is less efficient. Iansiti (1997) claims that
in a world of increasing technological options firms’ competitive advantages
are rooted in the ability to monitor and quickly seize the external opportunity.
A somewhat different tradition, influenced perhaps by Schumpeter’s
vision of even innovation becoming routine inside large firms, has emphasized
the pay-off from coordinated and large scale investments. Chandler’s account
of commercial success has stressed the importance of complementing
investments in R&D with coordinated investments in manufacturing and
marketing (Chandler, 1990). This view, which is closely linked to the
resource-based theory of the firm, stresses firm growth as a process of
exploiting slack resources within the company (e.g. Penrose, 1959; Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Shane, 1996). These accounts implicitly assume that such
slack resources are best employed by the firm itself. In this paper we depart
from the widespread premise in the technology management literature that
innovations are best exploited in-house and, instead, we look at the
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and corporate strategy.3
We begin the next section by clarifying what we mean by markets for
technology and by briefly reviewing some evidence on the rise of such markets
in recent years. Section 3 analyzes the consequences of ‘missing’ markets for
intangible assets and how the behavior of companies can be affected once
markets for such assets arise. Section 4 focuses on large, established firms. We
discuss how some of the established technology leaders are modifying their
strategies for appropriating rents from innovation by incorporating
technology licensing as an important option. Section 5 examines the different
challenges faced by the smaller firms, especially technology-based start-ups.
Section 6 deals with the external acquisition of technology. Section 7 discusses
the implications on entry and competition. Section 8 summarizes our main
conclusions.
2. Markets for Technology
2.1 A Tentative Definition
In this paper we use the term ‘market’ in a broad sense. Strictly speaking,
market transactions are arm’s length, anonymous and typically involve an
exchange of a good for money. Many, if not most, transactions for technology
which we have observed would fail one or the other criterion. Often they
involve quite detailed contracts and may be embedded in technological
alliances of some sort. Thus, though we shall often paint with a broad brush,
contrasting market transactions with processes inside a firm, it is not to
dispute the existence of hybrid forms which characterize market transactions
in technology but rather to sharpen the exposition.
The way technology is traded is linked to the peculiar nature of technology
as an economic asset and as a potential object of exchange. Technology comes
in very different forms and no general definition will fit. For instance,
technology can take the form of ‘intellectual property’ (patents) or intangibles
(e.g. a software program or a design) or it can be embodied in a product (e.g.
a prototype or a device like a chip designed to perform certain operations) or
it can take the form of technical services. We will not attempt to define
technology, treating it instead as an imprecise term for useful knowledge
rooted in engineering and scientific disciplines, which usually also draws from
3 Granstrand (1999) also analyzes firms’ strategies both as technology users and technology suppliers.
Malerba and Orsenigo (2000) do discuss strategic options when technology is tradable, but argue that the
conditions for making technology tradable are unlikely to be realized (see also Pavitt, 2000).
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transactions can take different forms, from pure licensing of well-defined
intellectual property to complicated collaborative agreements, which may
well include the further development of the technology or its realization ‘from
scratch’.4 Table 1 summarizes our definition of the market for technology in
the form of a simple typology, along with canonical examples for each case.
Our definition of the market for technology is close to that proposed by
the US Department of Justice in its Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property (US Department of Justice, 1995). The US Department of
Justice defines markets for technology as markets for ‘intellectual property
that is licensed and its close substitutes, i.e. the technologies or goods that are
close enough substitutes significantly to constrain the exercise of market
power with respect to the intellectual property that is licensed’ (US Depart-
ment of Justice, 1995, p. 6). Our definition in Table 1 also encompasses what
the Department of Justice calls ‘markets for innovation’, which are seen as
markets for ‘future’ technologies. These include arrangements in which the
parties agree to conduct activities, jointly or independently, leading to future
developments of technologies that will be exchanged (or jointly owned)
among them. This is typically the market for contract R&D and the various
types of technological alliances and joint ventures.
In sum, a market for technology refers to transactions for the use, diffusion
and creation of technology. This includes transactions involving full
TABLE 1. A Simple Typology of Markets for Technology









Sun licensing Java to IBM;





Licensing of IP core in
semiconductors






4 Transactions in technology can also occur through mergers and acquisitions and through the mobility
of people. However, given the already very broad scope of this paper, we shall ignore these cases here.
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and patent licensing. It also includes transactions involving knowledge that
is not patentable or not patented (e.g. software or the many non-patented
designs and innovations).
2.2 Some Suggestive Evidence
Markets for technology are not a new phenomenon. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff
(1997, 1998) have documented the existence of an active market for patents
in the US during the 19th century. However, it appears that these markets
declined after the 1920s and have become reinvigorated only in the last
couple of decades.5 In Arora et al. (2001a) we provided rough aggregate
estimates of the size and scope of markets for technology in recent decades.
Using systematic data on technology transactions we found that the extent of
technology trade has grown in the 1990s and high-tech industries, like
software, chemicals and electronics, lead the growth of such markets (see also
Merges, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000). Table 2 shows the total number
and value (in parentheses) of such transactions, by industrial sector, between
1985 and 1997.6 The value of a transaction is calculated here as the sum of
licensing and royalty payments and equity investments and R&D funding
provided in return for licensing rights.
Table 2 shows that there have been over 15 000 transactions in technology
with a total value of over $330 billion, implying an average of nearly 1150
transactions worth $27 billion per year. To put these numbers in perspective,
note that the total R&D spending in the USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France,
Italy and Canada was about $340 billion and non-defense R&D spending was
about $300 billion in 1995. Thus, the value of the total technology
transactions is about 9% of total non-defense R&D spending in the developed
countries.7 Although markets for technology are still in their infancy in many
5 A study by the British Technology Group (1998) has concluded that most large firms in the
industrialized countries have unused technologies that they have not licensed in the past but would like to
do so. This points to the under-development, if not absence, of a market for technology. Supporting
evidence comes from an estimate by the European Union that in Europe $20 billion are spent every
year to develop innovations and technologies that have already been developed elsewhere (see
www.european-patent-office.org/patinfopro/index.htm.)
6 The data are from a commercial database provided by the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), the
leading commercial provider of such data. The SDC data are constructed from SEC filings (10-Qs),
financial journals, news wire services, proxies and quarterly reports. We read through each transaction to
verify that technology transfer was involved. From the description of the agreement we also coded the
granter and the recipient of the technology or whether there was a two-way flow of technology, such as a
technology cross-licensing agreement.
7 There are a number of possible biases in both directions. We exclude outright acquisitions. Further,




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































425cases, the value of the transactions is already substantial. Our data also show
that the number of these transactions has been steadily increasing over time,
with the exception of the last two years in our sample (possibly reflecting
incomplete reporting of transactions for these years).
Specific industry case studies provide possibly the most compelling
evidence of the increasing importance of technology markets. The chemical
industry for instance is one in which technology licensing, both products
and processes, has been quite widespread for many years (see Arora and
Gambardella, 1998; Arora and Fosfuri, 2000). Similarly, technology trade is
becoming extensive in leading high-tech industries such as software,
semiconductors and biotechnology. In semiconductors there has been a
significant growth of the so-called ‘fabless’ or even ‘chipless’ companies, which
specialize in the design of self-contained, independent chip ‘modules’ and sell
their designs to other companies that design and manufacture the complex
chip in which the individual modules are embedded (Linden and Somaya,
1999). Further evidence about technology trade in the semiconductor field is
provided by Hall and Ham (1999), who find that licensing and cross-licensing
deals have risen significantly in this industry and that the propensity to patent
has increased during the last decade in response to the greater need to protect
intellectual property in such deals.
3. Markets for Technology and Corporate Strategies
3.1 The Effects of ‘Missing’ Markets for Corporate Assets
In order to understand the implications of markets for technology for cor-
porate strategy it is useful to begin with a more general discussion of missing
markets for assets that distinguish a firm from its competitors.8 These assets
include technology, production expertise and facilities, a strong brand name
reduce the value to about $15 billion per year. On the other hand, our database probably does not include
a large number of smaller value transactions and we are probably undercounting transactions from
1985–1987, as well as 1996 and 1997. Based on other studies, using IRS data on licensing and royalty
fees, we estimate the value of these flows to be of the order of $50 billion per year.
8 Clearly, assets that differentiate a firm from its competitors are different from standard commodities
and so also are the markets for such assets. This is particularly true for intangible assets like technology.
For one, the value of such assets is driven mostly by their use value (rather than cost of production) and
will therefore depend on the prospective buyer. Furthermore, intangible assets are not easy to define and
delineate. This implies that the assets may be ‘lumpy’; their transfer might be an all or nothing deal. In
renting such assets their use is likely to be more difficult to monitor and meter (Teece, 1998). Thus, instead
of speaking of the absence of markets for assets it is perhaps more accurate and realistic to speak about the
efficiency of such markets and the costs of transacting in the market. The terminology of missing markets
should therefore be understood as an expositional device.
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426reputation, human assets, supplier networks and established marketing
channels. The resource-based theory of the firm suggests that to be a source of
sustained above average performance resources must meet three criteria: they
must be valuable, rare and imperfectly mobile (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993;
Markides and Williamson, 1996). In other words, a competitive advantage
must be underpinned by resources for which well-functioning markets do not
or cannot exist. So, the firm builds a sustainable competitive advantage by
having access to assets that its competitors cannot access. Barney (1986) notes
that the possession of such assets must be rooted in imperfections in the factor
market, i.e. the market where the factors used to create such assets are traded,
and these imperfections ultimately arise from differences in the expectations
that firms hold about the future value of the assets (Barney, 1991). Cool and
Dierickx (1989) argue that not all the assets required to sustain competitive
advantage can be bought and sold. Instead, such assets must be accumulated
internally through a number of mechanisms over a period of time. Similarly,
much of the thinking on technology strategy has approached the problem by
implicitly or explicitly assuming that technological assets cannot be directly
bought and sold and the services of such assets cannot be ‘rented’. In this sense,
our paper builds on the resource-based view of the firm by analyzing what
happens when some assets that were not tradable become tradable.
What are the consequences of such a missing market for technology? The
immediate consequence is that the innovator must exploit the technology
in-house,9 i.e. in order to extract the value from the technology (or rather its
services) it must be embodied in goods and services which are then sold. Such
goods and services must have lower costs or command higher prices to deliver
returns that are greater than the competitive rate of returns; firms earn
‘quasi-rents’.
Consider a case where a firm has developed a new cost-reducing technology
for the production of a certain good. In order to extract value from the
technology the firm must use it to produce the good. Not only does this
require the firm to have access to the complementary assets (such as land and
physical equipment, marketing channels and so on), but the returns would
also depend on the volume of output that the firm can produce and sell. If
the complementary assets are themselves not traded in a competitive market
or if firms differ in their access to them then firms that have superior access
to these complementary assets will be able to derive greater value from the
9 This is purposely a polar characterization in which either there are markets or there are not. We
acknowledge that this statement ignores a variety of ‘hybrid’ organizational arrangements that might be
potentially used in the absence of markets. For instance, Pisano (1990) shows that the use of equity as a
hostage in biotechnology research contracts can be a hybrid form to exploit research.
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427technology.10 Similarly, firms that can exploit the technology on a bigger
scale will be able to derive greater value (Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Klepper,
1996).
Following this logic further, larger firms or firms with superior access to
complementary assets will have a greater incentive to invest in the technology
in the first instance. Taking this one step further, firms investing in technology
would be well advised to also invest in the complementary assets that cannot
be easily and efficiently acquired from the market. In other words, as Teece
(1986) put it, firms have to invest in creating co-specialized assets to
maximize their returns from developing new technology. In sum, in the
absence of a market for technology, a firm must often acquire other assets in
order to extract profits from the technology. Insofar as these other assets are
themselves expensive and illiquid, well-capitalized, large, integrated firms
that possess such assets have greater incentives to invest in developing new
technologies (Nelson, 1959). Conversely, smaller firms face major hurdles in
developing and commercializing technology.
The situation is quite different when the asset can be sold or rented.
Complementary assets need not be owned or even directly accessed by the
technology developer. The relative importance of complementary assets
within the boundaries of the individual firms diminishes compared with the
existence of such complementary assets at the level of industries or markets
as a whole. Clearly, as we shall also note below, transaction costs or other
factors may increase the cost of acquiring the complementary assets externally
compared with owning them in-house, even when such markets exist. In
Arora et al. (2001a) we distinguished between cognitive factors (such as
context dependence and absorptive capacity), contractual problems and other
market imperfections that can limit the ability of firms to access external com-
plementary assets. As these imperfections become less important then, to use
Teece’s terminology, the existence of complementary assets at the level of
markets or industries may offset the lack of such assets at the level of the firm.
Ultimately, a market for the asset provides the innovator (a firm that has
developed new technology) with more options. Instead of embodying a newly
developed technology in goods and services a firm may choose to sell or license
it to others or may choose to buy it from external providers rather than
develop it in-house. This does not mean that companies would only acquire
10 The literature clearly distinguishes between generic and specialized complementary assets (Teece,
1986). When the complementary assets are specialized there is an additional pressure to integration. When
the complementary assets are generic it is more likely that a market for such assets will work well,
providing even access to the assets to all firms. By definition, specialized or co-specialized assets face an
illiquid and imperfect market. It is only when the market for complementary assets is perfectly competitive
that differences across firms in the access to the complementary assets are completely leveled out.
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choose the right balance between external acquisition and in-house develop-
ment of technologies, even though for companies with lower in-house
technological capabilities the existence of external technology sources may be
critical to enhance their ability to produce and sell more innovative goods
(Iansiti and West, 1997). Similarly, a market for technology assets does not
mean that innovating firms will become pure licensing companies, although
several small (and not so small) firms have been successful as specialized
technology suppliers. Rather, as we shall also note below, the appropriate
strategy in the presence of markets for technology depends on the efficiency
of markets for other types of assets, including finance. Moreover, in thinking
about how a market for technology conditions strategies there is one other
industry-level force that must be considered. Markets, particularly efficient
markets, are great levelers. A market for technology lowers entry barriers and
increases competition in the product market, which often implies a rethink of
existing strategies. In turn, this implies that when there exists a well-
functioning market for an asset such an asset cannot be a source of sustainable
competitive advantage and firms have to look somewhere else to gain an edge
over competitors.
3.2 Markets for Technology and Strategies for Appropriating
Rents
Teece (1986) identifies several critical dimensions for the appropriability of
the returns of firm’s intellectual property: the nature of the technology, the
strength of the property rights regime, complementary assets, the ease of
replication and the ease of imitation. Appropriation through licensing works
best when there exists a substantial gap between replication and imitation
costs. If the technology is easy to replicate and transfer but difficult to imitate
the innovator can capture a large part of the rents simply by licensing. Hence,
when the underlying knowledge base is sufficiently codified and not context-
specific and intellectual property rights are well defined and protected,
licensing can work well (Williamson, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1993).
For instance, as discussed in Arora and Gambardella (1998), there exists a
very large market for chemical processes and engineering services. The
development of chemical engineering played an important role in developing
more general and abstract ways of conceptualizing chemical processes. As
well, patents are thought to work better in chemicals than in other industries
(see for instance Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 1997). In addition, many
processes, especially in petrochemicals, are designed around a specific variety
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from simple structural analysis alone. The licensor can therefore use the
catalyst as a credible hostage: failure by the licensee to respect the initial
agreement can trigger a cut-off in supply of the catalyst.
However, Teece (1988) argued that appropriation of the returns from
innovation through licensing is the exception and not the rule. In other words,
the best way of appropriating the rents from technology is by directly
embodying it into goods and products. In a more recent paper Teece (1998)
recognizes that the formation of markets for technology might change this
view. He notes that the unbundling of intellectual property from products
generates a new environment for knowledge management where the focus is
on how to capture value from knowledge assets, even though he warns that
‘ ...b e c o m i n gap u r el i c e n s i n gc o m p a n yn o td i r e c t l yi n v o l v e di nt h e
production market and increasingly remote from the manufacture and design
of the product itself can be a risky strategy . . .’ (see Grindley and Teece,
1997). Since risk is sometimes worth the additional reward, the innovator
now has the option to balance its ability to extract value from the asset by
embodying it in products and services against the transaction costs involved
in trading the technology. In this respect, licensing is an option not mutually
exclusive with self-production. Hence, with a market for technology a firm
needs to recognize what its core, non-tradable and tradable competencies are.
Having done so, it can decide whether a given discovery or technological
competency is to be exploited in-house or through licensing. In many
instances firms might possess some ‘non-core’ technologies (in some cases of
very substantial value) which can be profitably licensed.11
The decision on whether to exploit the technology in-house or not depends
on a number of factors. First and foremost it depends on the distribution of
complementary assets. If the firm has superior access to the complementary
assets compared with its rivals, in-house exploitation is clearly an attractive
strategy. Conversely, if the firm lacks the complementary assets it may
consider selling or licensing the technology. An important special case arises
when the technology in question is generic in terms of its application, such as
the case of a general purpose technology. In this case only an extraordinarily
large and well-diversified firm will be able to satisfactorily exploit the
technology in-house. Otherwise, it is far more likely that the relevant com-
plementary assets will be more broadly distributed, so that licensing the
technology would yield higher returns.
11 An anonymous referee correctly pointed out that sometimes self-production is a necessary condition
for successful licensing. For instance, self-production could help assess the true value of the technology or
could help identify potential bottlenecks in technology transfer. However, when there exists  a
well-functioning market for technology these problems are likely to be less relevant.
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in the markets for different types of assets. If the transaction costs of acquiring
complementary assets, such as production and marketing capabilities, are
lower than the transaction costs involved in selling or licensing the technology
an innovator lacking the complementary capabilities may nonetheless choose
to exploit its technology in-house.12 In fact, there are many factors that affect
transaction  costs  for  technology  exchange. Foremost  among  them are
well-defined and enforced property rights. Property rights are easier to define
and enforce and transaction costs for technology licensing contracts are lower
when the knowledge is articulatable (Winter, 1987) and can be represented
in terms of general and abstract categories (Arora and Gambardella, 1994).
Such representations reduce the context dependence of the technology, freeing
it up to be used more generally and reducing the cognitive barriers to
technology transfer (see also von Hippel, 1990, 1994).
Difficulty in valuation can significantly increase transaction costs. Accurate
valuation is particularly important in cases where the firm lacks downstream
assets to commercialize the technology. Current accounting practices and
norms, derived as they are from times when measuring tangible and material
assets was their crucial task, have to be modified in order for technology
markets to flourish. This is a complex issue and a full discussion is well beyond
the scope of the present paper (Deng et al., 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999).
What is less well understood is the role that technology markets themselves
can play in improving the accounting for intangible technological assets. A
market for technology improves the accuracy of any valuation attempt. It
does so in the most obvious way, by providing an objective measure of the
value, if the asset has been traded in the past or if similar assets have been
traded. Needless to say, technology is highly differentiated and its ‘price’ is
likely to reflect factors that are idiosyncratic to the buyer and the seller. Thus,
any monetary measure is likely to be imperfect. That said, such problems are
not unique to the measurement of the value of technology. A flourishing
market for paintings by Old Masters, for instance, shows that product
differentiation and idiosyncratic sources of value do not preclude the existence
of a reasonably well-functioning market.
Moreover, when investing in R&D firms are implicitly making such
measurements, as do investors when they value the firms in capital markets.
Markets for technology allow for the possibility of valuing the contribution of
technology separately from the value of other valuable assets the firm may
12 The transaction costs approach that we adopt in this paper has some well-known limitations (see
Lazonick, 1991). We have discussed some of these limitations in Arora et al. (2001a).
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technology without necessarily having to acquire downstream capabilities.
In addition to transaction costs, the decision about in-house exploitation
also depends on the extent of competition in the different markets in the
‘value chain’ of innovation. For instance, the innovator may face much greater
competition in the product market than in the market for technology. In this
case the returns from in-house exploitation are likely to be small, limited by
the ability of the innovator to increase its sales and gain market share,
typically a slow process. The innovator may face much less competition in the
technology market and may be able to extract much higher returns there.
These considerations led Qualcomm to exit from producing handsets
embodying its code division multiple access (CDMA) technology and focus on
technology licensing. In the early 1990s Qualcomm introduced a wireless
telephone technology, based on CDMA technology, which was markedly
superior to the existing technology. It embodied this technology into cellular
phones (handsets) and grew rapidly, with a turnover of $4 billion and a net
income of more than $200 million in 1999. However, Qualcomm has decided
to drastically refashion its business. Citing falling margins in the CDMA
handset operations, it divested itself of manufacturing and focused on
generating and licensing its CDMA technology. On an annualized basis
Qualcomm earned nearly $400 million in licensing and royalty in 1999,
which is slightly more than what Qualcomm spent on R&D in the same year
(Company 8-K Report, 1999).
4. Licensing and Related Technology Strategies by Large Firms
4.1 Revenue versus Rent-dissipation Effects in the Licensing
Strategies of Large Firms
The decision by a large established company of whether or not to license its
technology is the result of two main forces pushing in opposite directions: the
‘revenue effect’ and the ‘profit dissipation effect’ (see Arora and Fosfuri,
1999). Licensing forces a trade-off: licensing and royalty revenues net of
transaction costs (the ‘revenue effect’) have to be balanced against the lower
price–cost margins and reduced market share that the increased competition
(the ‘profit dissipation effect’) from the licensee implies. Although the licensor
has many different strategies to limit the extent of this latter effect (for
instance, the contract might impose  quantity  restrictions or  exclusive
territories or unit royalties might be fixed such as to control the licensee’s
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share. This implies that firms with a large product market share (and by
implication possessing the required complementary assets) are better off
exploiting the technology in-house. On the other hand, if the product market
share is small the firm may be able to increase profits by licensing in addi-
tion to in-house exploitation. Similarly, licensing is more attractive when
the licensee operates in a different market and is unlikely to compete very
strongly.
This is exemplified by the different ways in which BP Chemicals has ap-
proached acetic acid and polyethylene. In acetic acid BP Chemicals has strong
proprietary technology and a substantial market share. It licenses very
selectively, typically only licensing to get access to markets it would otherwise
be unable to enter. In contrast, in polyethylene BP’s market share is small.
Although it has good proprietary technology as well, there are a dozen other
sources of technology for making polyethylene. Thus BP has licensed its
polyethylene technology very aggressively, competing with Union Carbide,
which was the market leader in licensing polyethylene technology. Even here
BP initially tried not to license in Western Europe, where it had a substantial
share of polyethylene capacity. However, other licensors continued to supply
technology to firms that wished to produce polyethylene in Western Europe,
with the result that BP found that it was losing potential licensing revenues
without any benefits in the form of restraining entry.
BP is not alone in choosing to appropriate rents by licensing its technology.
For instance, Union Carbide is reported to have earned $300 million from its
polyolefin licensing in 1992 (Grindley and Nickerson, 1996). In 1998 IBM
patent licensing revenues reached $1 billion, or nearly $750 000 per patent,
accounting for over 10% of IBM’s net profits (Rivette and Kline, 1999). Texas
Instruments is reported to have earned royalties of over $1.8 billion between
1986 and 1993, a figure comparable to its cumulative net income during this
period (Grindley and Teece, 1997). A number of other firms, including
companies such as Dow Chemicals, Procter & Gamble, Philips, Boeing and
Monsanto, which have traditionally neither licensed their technology nor
acquired technologies from the outside, have embraced technology licensing
as an integral part of their technology management strategy.
Table 3 reports information from the web sites of some leading corporations
wherein they advertise internal technologies available for licenses. Some of
these companies have even created a special internal division that focuses on
licensing of their technologies. For instance, in 1994 DuPont created the
Corporate Technology Transfer Group, a division with the specific task of
overseeing all technology transfer activities.
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several related factors. First, the growing demand for technologies has
increased the opportunities for selling technologies. Moreover, globalization,
along with the low transportation costs of technologies, has meant that large
companies with sizable technological portfolios have the opportunity to
exploit their technology on a very large scale, provided they license. Second,
the better functioning and the increasingly better organization of markets for
technology has eased the opportunities for this type of trading. As a result,
several  leading large  companies have  recognized the  opportunities  for
incrementing their returns on R&D by selling technologies rather than
focusing only on their internal exploitation. Moreover, as noted above, there
TABLE 3. Selected Web Pages Advertising the Licensing of Intellectual Property
Company www address Available for licensing
Boeing www.boeing.com/assocproducts/
mdip/home.html
Algorithms, laser technology and
manufacturing, coatings, material
processing, composite technologies,
materials, factory hand tools,
measurement systems, fasteners,
placement systems, video displays,
fiber optic sensors and demodulation
systems
IBM www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing Processes used in integrated circuits,











polyolefin resins and compounds,
solvents, intermediates and monomers,
coating materials, speciality polymers
and products
Philips www.licensing.philips.com CD, DVD, SACD, MPEG, AC3
Procter &
Gamble
www.pgtechnologytransfer.com Procter & Gamble online market for
technology
Yet2.com www.yet2.com All types of technology: an online
market for technology backed by
several large US corporations (e.g. 3M,
AlliedSignal, Boeing, Dow Chemical,
Ford, Honeywell, Polaroid, Procter &
Gamble, Rockwell)
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technologies that they do not use themselves. These factors have prompted
many of these companies to organize their technological portfolios and to
focus more forcefully on the effective management of their technologies and
intellectual capital. On the demand side increased competitive pressures and
falling tariff and regulatory barriers to entry have created a large pool of
potential technology buyers, firms that see their core competence not in
creating technology but rather in exploiting it.
Clearly, there are many reasons why firms license, and not all of them can
be ascribed to the specifics of markets for technology that we are trying to
advance here. For instance, firms may license to create demand, to deter entry
by stronger rivals or to dissuade rivals from launching their own R&D projects
in the area. Most importantly, in certain sectors, like electronics and software,
firms may license their technology to create de facto market standards which
they control and can exploit. However, the examples we have provided above
illustrate the growing importance of markets for technology. They suggest
that large firms are actually refocusing their technology strategy to seek
additional returns from their R&D efforts by selling their technologies
disembodied from products.
4.2 Increasing Importance of ‘Intellectual Property’
Management
The discussion above also points to the need for firms to take the management
of their intellectual property seriously. Recent work by Granstrand (1999) and
Rivette and Kline (1999) details how patent data can be used for competitive
intelligence, to identify potential licensees, to identify potential research staff
and to understand where the firm should focus its research efforts. Grindley
and Teece (1997) also note that in some firms the management of intellectual
property has moved from the licensing of ‘non-core’ technologies to become a
central element in technology strategy. They recognize that in industries like
semiconductors and electronics licensing and cross-licensing have become a
means for generating revenues as an alternative to direct production. In turn
this implies that management needs to undertake a more active and positive
stance towards licensing and intellectual property in general. A related
implication is that firms should be more careful about efficiently managing
their intellectual property. In particular, they should identify technological
areas to apply more forcefully for patent protection. Since both applying and
maintaining a patent can be costly, firms might be selective in their patenting
strategy.
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1999) on intellectual property rights highlights several new implications that
the rise in technology transactions has meant for corporate strategy. The
report recognizes up front that markets for technologies, ideas, knowledge
and information have difficulties in operating. However, it points out that a
well-defined system of protection of intellectual property can help develop a
market for technological knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 1994;
Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Merges, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000). The
report stresses the importance of proactive management of intellectual
property rights for both large and small firms. The creation of an ‘intellectual
property culture’ in firms has become crucial and this is especially true for
European firms, which are lagging behind their US and Japanese counter-
parts.13
Firms are still experimenting with how best to manage their intellectual
assets and no single organization scheme will suit all firms. However, what is
clear is that the old system of leaving patenting and licensing decisions largely
under the control of the general counsel’s office is likely to change drastically.
For instance, Xerox is often seen as an example of a firm that has mis-
managed its intellectual property, having invented but failed to profit from a
number of pathbreaking developments such as the PC and the graphical user
interface. In 1997 Xerox had 8000 patents, earning only $8.5 million in
revenues, not covering even the maintenance costs. Xerox set in motion a
systematic process for cataloging and evaluating its patent portfolio, pruning
and giving away (often to universities) patents it did not wish to keep and
monitoring the use of the rest. To guide the use of intellectual property a
Xerox Intellectual Property Office (XIPO) was also set up as a separate profit
center, headed by a vice president level officer reporting directly to the top
management of the firm and overseeing all patent and licensing decisions.
Lucent has adopted a similar structure, creating an intellectual property
business unit as a profit center responsible for managing intellectual property
on a corporate wide level (Rivette and Kline, 1999).
Dow Chemicals has taken a somewhat different approach. Dow used to
have two people to manage its licensing business. Individual business units
made their own decisions independently of each other. The recession in the
early 1990s and the need to cut costs brought the over $1 billion R&D budget
under close scrutiny. In 1994 Dow Chemicals significantly restructured
13 The ETAN report also argues that a less well-understood role of patents is information sources.
Indeed, although not yet routinely exploited (with the exception of chemicals and pharmaceuticals), patent
databases enable access to one of the most comprehensive and accessible sources of scientific and
technological information. In addition, with the new information and communication technologies this
rich source of data is more easily utilized by companies and becomes a useful instrument for designing
technology strategies.
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valued and assigned to one of 15 major business units. A new structure was
put in place under which intellectual property managers from each business
unit would meet regularly to review patent activity on an enterprise-wide
basis. Dow Chemicals now earns $125 million in patent licensing, up from
$25 million in 1994 (Rivette and Kline, 1999).
4.3 Corporate Venturing
Before we move on to the analysis of technology strategies by smaller firms
and start-ups, a final important technology strategy by the larger firms is
corporate venturing. As Levinthal and March (1993) note, large firms, with
their established routines and structures, are better suited to exploitation
than exploration. In somewhat different language, large firms may be better
adapted to incremental improvements of existing technologies and for
commercialization of discoveries than for making new discoveries, particularly
radical breakthroughs. Indeed, when such firms make a significant discovery
they may not recognize or nurture it adequately, especially if the discovery is
not perceived as relating to the firm’s core operations and markets.
Increasingly firms are spinning off these technologies as new ventures. These
ventures are initially funded and managed by the parent.
Corporate venturing has increased in popularity in recent years and some
believe that it may overtake venture capital as the leading source of fund-
ing for technology-based start-ups. Chesbrough (2000) compares corporate
venturing with venture capital. The advantages of corporate venturing
include the ability to provide more ‘patient’ capital and the ability to leverage
complementary co-specialized assets. A significant potential advantage of
corporate venturing is the ability to learn from failures. However, corporate
venturing has its disadvantages compared with independent start-ups. These
disadvantages include delays in decision making and the less high powered
incentives given to managers. Many firms see this as a way of earning high
financial returns as well as accomplishing strategic objectives. A full
discussion of corporate venturing is beyond the scope of this paper. None
theless, it does appear that corporate venturing, a compromise between
in-house development and an entrepreneurial start-up, has thus far met with
only limited success. It appears to work best when there are strong strategic
links between the venture and the parent (Chesbrough, 2000). Moreover,
corporate venturing is too heavily dependent on the availability of slack
financial resources. With increasing capital market pressures such slack
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is unlikely to always substitute for trading technology.
5. The Different Challenges Faced by Smaller Firms
Smaller firms face a different set of trade-offs from established large
corporations in choosing between licensing and self-exploitation. Typically
small firms, particularly technology-based start-ups, have to acquire the
complementary assets should they choose to exploit their innovation by
commercializing it themselves. For start-ups the choice often amounts to a
fundamental choice of the business model itself.14 The choice depends not
only on the efficiency of a market for technology but also on the efficiency of
the markets for the complementary assets. In other words, in deciding how to
exploit their technology small firms and start-ups must trade off the costs of
acquiring capital and building in-house production, distribution and
marketing capability against the rents that would be lost or shared with their
partners in a licensing deal.
A commonplace about technology licensing, particularly from the per-
spective of small firms, is that the technology owner does not get the full
return from the technology (see for example Caves et al., 1983). There are two
main reasons for the failure of innovators to capture more fully the rents from
innovation: inefficiency of contracts for technology and differences in bargain-
ing power. A related potential problem is that with a royalty-based contract
the innovator’s earnings depend on the effort and investment that its licensees
make in commercializing the technology. Thus the firm is unable to control
its own fate, increasing the chances of failure. For instance, Rambus, which
developed a highly successful architectural interface that speeds up data
transfer, depends critically upon manufacturers of semiconductor devices,
notably Intel, for its survival.15 In many instances this leads entrepreneurs to
a d o p tas t r a t e g yw h e r e b yt h e yt r yt oa c q u i r et h ec o m p l e m e n t a r ya s s e t s
themselves to avoid having to share rents.
There are some potential pitfalls in such a strategy. The obvious one is that
small firms also have limited bargaining power when it comes to acquiring
14 Although many start-ups adopt a business model whereby they begin by licensing technology and
doing contract research for others and use those earnings to acquire the required complementary assets.
15 Rambus licenses its technology to all firms that make microprocessors, DRAMS, ASICS or PC
controllers and chip sets. Rambus does not itself produce any semiconductor devices. It lacks any special
advantage in the manufacture of semiconductor devices, which requires large investments in fabrication
facilities in addition to a great deal of tacit knowledge. By not producing any semiconductor device
Rambus also steers clear of any potential conflict of interests and avoids competing with its customers.
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exploit the technology themselves. Further, to the extent that many of the
complementary assets are themselves not readily accessible through a market
mechanism and to the extent that the entrepreneurial start-up may not be
very efficient at building those assets in-house, in-house exploitation is
probably a much riskier and possibly less efficient strategy.
As with the market for technology, the markets for the other assets are also
developing. The clearest example is the tremendous growth in angel and
venture capital. The great success that small start-ups have had in attracting
financing through the equity market has also reduced the cost of both
technology development and acquiring some of the complementary assets.16
Another example is the growth of merchant fabricators in semiconductors,
such as TSCM and several such firms, which are developing for instance in
countries like Taiwan. These firms have invested in large semiconductor
foundries and manufacture application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs)
and other types of semiconductor devices for other firms. A start-up firm that
has developed new semiconductor technology can outsource production to a
foundry and market its devices itself by developing a marketing and distri-
bution organization. Whether it ought to develop a marketing organization
or appropriate the rents from its technology through licensing the technology
to others depends in part on whether it is likely to be able to develop and
manage a marketing operation efficiently.
As the case of Cambridge Display Technologies (CDT) indicates, an in-
novative start-up firm often may not be able to manage downstream activities
efficiently. CDT, a Cambridge University spin-off in Britain, specializes in
conjugated polymer technologies, with light-emitting polymers being a key
application. This can lead to the production of light-emitting plastics for
application in a wide range of businesses, from calculators, cellular phones and
similar displays to laptop computer screens.
When the technology was first developed in the early 1990s the CTD
founders, mainly Cambridge University researchers, tried to develop and
manufacture the technology. The result was that the company nearly went
bankrupt. When professional managers were brought in they changed the
business model so that the key CTD business is to license the technology to
established manufacturers. CDT has entered into licensing and co-develop-
ment and manufacturing deals with companies like Philips Electronics,
16 For instance, Amazon, the online bookseller, is now investing large sums in building warehouses and
distribution centers. An alternative strategy could have been to ally with a firm with a large distribution
network, such as Kmart.
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439Seiko-Epson, Hoechst and DuPont. This recognizes that although CDT has
world leading ability in the light-emitting polymers area it does not have the
developed manufacturing and marketing skills which are also essential to be
a world class display manufacturer. Through licensing out patents and per-
forming technology transfer CDT can enable its partners to apply their
complementary skills to the technology to develop specific products for their
markets.
There are other important considerations involved that militate against
self-exploitation as well. Even if the firm can develop and manage the
complementary assets efficiently, these assets may be much longer lived than
the technology itself. This puts the innovator in the position of having to
develop new technologies to ‘feed’ these complementary assets. Failing which,
the firm will be left with an under-utilized manufacturing facility or
marketing network. Unless these assets, or their services, can be traded on the
market, at least a part of the value of these assets will be lost.
The case of Syntex illustrates the risk involved when an innovative firm
chooses to build up firm-specific complementary assets to exploit an inno-
vation in-house. Syntex was founded in 1944 in Mexico City and relocated 20
years later to Palo Alto, CA. During the early 1980s the firm became
extremely successful thanks to a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug based
on the compound naproxen (Naprosyn), first marketed in 1976. In 1981
Syntex listed on the New York Stock Exchange and in 1987 it reached
$1 billion in annual sales. However, when the patents on Naprosyn expired
in 1993 and generic products started to flood the market Syntex became
financially distressed. Its stock price plummeted from $54 a share in January
1992 to $18 a share 18 months later. In late 1993 Roche Holdings, the Swiss
pharmaceutical firm, acquired Syntex in a deal valued at more than $5 billion.
Syntex’s operations in Palo Alto, after some restructuring, were transformed
into a research facility with support and strategic marketing planning staff.
The proximate cause of Syntex’ failure was its inability to discover a new
blockbuster when the patents on Naprosyn expired. Indeed, Syntex’s strong
research abilities notwithstanding, pharmaceutical innovations still depend a
great deal upon serendipity. Bad luck associated with large fixed costs led
Syntex into a huge financial distress which triggered the acquisition by Roche.
Leaving aside the question of whether Syntex’s research productivity had
declined, consider the role of the business model. Had Syntex not built up a
substantial downstream manufacturing and marketing capability it might
have been able to ride out the lean periods, because it would not have had to
find the revenues to support its downstream operations. Moreover, this
business model also implied that Syntex had to invest in extremely costly drug
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problem is not that Syntex had to exit the market. Had Syntex failed because
its research ceased to be productive exit would be both privately and socially
desirable. Syntex’s research capability continued to be valuable, as evidenced
by how Roche repositioned Syntex after the acquisition. In sum, the problem
was that Syntex failed as a pharmaceutical firm, destroying some of the value
of the downstream assets that it had invested in. Put differently, even if
integration did not hurt its research productivity, the failure of research
destroyed the value of the Syntex brand name plus the value (partially) of
other firm-specific assets that Syntex had built up.17
Finally, and perhaps most important from a long-term perspective, integ-
ration may reduce the innovative potential of the firm, because acquisition of
the complementary assets inevitably increases the size of firms and induces
important changes in the culture of the firm and in the speed and fluidity of
information flows. As Levinthal and March (1993) note, organizations divide
attention and resources between two broad groups of activities. They engage
in the pursuit of new knowledge, exploration, and the use and development
of what is known, exploitation. Although not identical, exploration is similar
to the notion of research and development, while exploitation is closer to the
more downstream activities of production and marketing. A blend of
exploration and exploitation is desirable (March, 1991; Levinthal and March,
1993), but dynamics within organizations may lead exploitation to drive out
exploration. For instance, learning processes driven by experience, as is
typically the case in manufacturing and marketing, tend to favor exploitation,
because exploitation provides clearer, earlier and closer feedback (Levinthal
and March, 1993).
These dynamics are hard to resist in larger organizations. Large organiza-
tions are unable to provide high powered incentives for exploration. Contrast
that with the incentives that the threat of bankruptcy and stock options
provide for exploration in small start-ups. Further, as Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) have demonstrated, limited liability implies that smaller organiza-
tions, with fewer fixed assets at stake, will be willing to undertake more risks.
Large organizations can try to encourage exploration by forming and
nurturing small subunits that are isolated from the rest of the organization.
As noted earlier, such ‘corporate ventures’ have inherent limitations. The
17 An anonymous referee raised the question of whether Syntex could have tried to ‘rent’ its fixed
complementary assets to stave off the crisis. Although marketing agreements, which in effect amount to
one partner  ‘renting’  its marketing asset  to the  other  partner, are known to take place in the
pharmaceutical industry, we can only surmise that Syntex’s marketing and production capabilities were
not sufficiently attractive to potential renters. Indeed, financial stability, threatened by the failure to
replace Naproysn, would appear to be a sina qua non in a marketing or production partner.
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is mixed. Levinthal and March (1993) also note that corporate ventures tend
to yield modest returns. In sum, there are reasons to believe that as a
research-intensive company converts itself into an integrated firm, with
in-house manufacturing and marketing units, its research productivity is
likely to decline.18
6. The External Acquisition of Technology and the
‘Not Invented Here’ Syndrome
Markets for technology also affect the firm in its role as a user of technology.
The strategic imperative is not only to maximize the revenues from the firm’s
actual stock of technologies but also to identify technologies that are available
at a reasonable price and that will increase the value of existing assets (Iansiti,
1997; Insiti and West, 1997). This does not imply that firms can simply rely
on outside technologies and need not invest in R&D themselves. Evaluating
technologies and being able to use them requires substantial in-house
scientific and technological expertise (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Arora and
Gambardella, 1994). As Mowery (1984) has pointed out, a firm is far better
equipped to absorb the output of external R&D if it is also performing some
R&D internally. A related but different interpretation of this is provided by
Gans and Stern (2000), who argue that technology buyers need to invest in
R&D to strengthen their bargaining position in licensing negotiations. In
short, internal and external R&D are complements, not substitutes.
The ability of the firm to evaluate and use outside technology may be con-
ditioned by its existing organizational structure, which limits information
flows and how opportunities are framed (e.g. Henderson and Clark, 1990).
Sometimes firms tend to disregard external technology options completely.
The ‘not invented here’ syndrome often has legitimate roots, as corporations
attempt to instill pride in the achievements of their researchers. It may also
serve to motivate the firm’s researchers. Rotemberg and Saloner (1994)
developed a model in which a ‘not invented here’ type of corporate culture
may serve a valuable role of committing the corporation to develop the
technologies invented by the firm’s in-house R&D departments, thereby
providing the appropriate incentives to the researchers. However, in a world
18 As against this, Kline and Rosernberg (1986) explain in their chain-link model of innovation that
these assets may provide valuable feedback to research about customer preferences and manufacturing
trade-offs, thereby making the research process economically more valuable. The chain-link model seems
to be a very good model for understanding the great success Japanese firms such as Toyota and Sony have
enjoyed. Nonetheless, there is a definite opportunity cost to such a tight coupling between the various
parts of the innovation chain, in the form of greater emphasis on exploitation at the cost of exploration.
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likely to be very costly.
Markets for technology increase the penalty of the ‘not invented here’
syndrome. In the first place, the wide diffusion of new technology producers
(other firms, smaller technology suppliers, universities, etc.) makes R&D
duplications likely. Even in a specialized field several research units may be
working on similar problems or there could be units that have already solved
problems that other units are facing. By relying only on internally developed
solutions companies can end up ‘reinventing the wheel’.
This also points to the importance of systematic monitoring of external
technological developments on a world wide basis. By using and building
upon basic or generic technologies developed elsewhere companies can focus
on developing specialized applications that better suit the needs of their local
markets (Iansiti and West, 1997). ‘Global’ markets for technology can
improve the innovation potential and the competitiveness of companies in
technologically and possibly economically less dynamic regions. These
markets permit an effective division of labor between technology producers
located in areas that are more efficient in the production of technology and
local producers, who have greater comparative advantages in understanding
the needs of their customers. Thus chemical producers in developing countries
can rely upon firms in developed countries to provide both technology and
know-how and focus on ways to source raw materials and on developing the
market for the products (Arora et al., 2001b).
This is particularly true with general purpose technologies (GPTs) and when
there exists a market for these technologies. Under such conditions it pays the
individual firms to buy the GPT and focus on customization of the technology,
rather than developing the whole technology or innovation from scratch. For
instance, firms in developing countries can specialize in adapting the GPT to
their markets and therefore rely on their non-tradable knowledge of local
demand, norms and regulations. A similar argument can be made across
industries rather than across countries. Notably, it pays firms to use GPTs from
leading GPT industries and customize them for their own sectors, markets or
clients, rather than developing their own industry-specific technology.
To summarize, there are at least two main implications of markets for
technology for companies as users of technology. First, markets for technology
point to the growing importance of strategies based on monitoring external
technological developments. As argued by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), this
also means that companies have to develop adequate internal technological
capabilities because greater internal technological skills are typically
associated with greater ability to take advantage of outside technological
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‘customize’ products and technologies. Thus if basic technologies can be made
available to a larger number of competitors in an industry, the sources of
competitive advantages move downstream. This explains why several
companies are increasing the ‘service content’ of their products. Services
b u n d l e dw i t hp r o d u c t sc a nb et h o u g h to fa ss o l u t i o n st op r o b l e m st h a t
customers have, rather in the way systems integrators like IBM or Anderson
Consulting provide solutions to business problems rather  than  selling
computers or software.
7. Industry-level Effects: Vertical Specialization, Entry and
Competition
At the industry level markets for technology can potentially give rise to
significant industry-wide economies of specialization in the production of
technology, especiallyif they encourage theformation of specializedtechnology
suppliers. Markets for technology may then provide the downstream industries
with the classical Smithian and Stiglerian advantages of division of labor.
The story of the specialized engineering firms (SEFs) in chemical processing
is a natural example (see Arora and Gambardella, 1998). SEFs are firms
specializing in the design, engineering and construction of chemical plants.
Although some of them were founded as early as the 1920s, SEFs arose in the
aftermath of World War II following the rapid growth of demand for chemical
products. SEFs reaped the advantages of specialization. By working for many
clients they benefited from learning by doing and by repeatedly selling their
expertise (through licenses or engineering services) they could spread the cost
of accumulating that expertise over a larger output. As with any division of
labor, the advantages of vertical specialization then translated into greater
efficiency in the downstream industry as well (see also Freeman, 1968). Over
time the advantages that SEFs enjoyed in design and construction of certain
types of chemical plants made them the preferred source for such services. In
many cases SEFs also provided in-house proprietary technology, often on very
attractive terms. This reinforces our earlier point that when markets for
technology exist the penalties from not monitoring the opportunities that are
created by them or from not using these markets or, even worse, from
persisting with the ‘not invented here’ syndrome can be substantial.
Merges (1998) provides a number of examples of other types of firms that
might be thought of as the SEFs of the pharmaceutical and fine chemicals
industry. Firms such as Catalytica, ChemDesign and SepraChem are lever-
aging research and their expertise in asymmetrical synthesis to develop new
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intermediates. These firms both develop proprietary technologies and either
license them to pharmaceutical and specialty chemical companies or enter
into alliances to supply the latter with purer and better inputs. Interestingly,
M e r g e s( 1 9 9 8 )a l s on o t e st h a tt h i st r e n dh a si n d u c e ds o m ee s t a b l i s h e d
producers to spin-off units to provide contracted process development and
manufacturing services to the pharmaceutical industry.
Markets for technology lower barriers to entry, especially when they give
rise to an industry of specialized technology suppliers. For instance, while
SEFs originated as an American phenomenon, during the 1950s and the
1960s US SEFs became a source of technology for the European and Japanese
chemical industries. This enabled the European and Japanese chemical
producers to rise and grow and to compete with US chemical companies in
the international market. Similarly, SEFs  from  the  advanced  countries
nowadays supply technologies to chemical producers in less developed
countries and these companies compete with the chemical industry of the
First World in the developing country markets, largely thanks to the
availability of Western technologies (Arora et al., 2001b).19 More generally, in
the international context markets for technology can lead to a dramatic
shortening of product life cycles.20
The example also highlights a closely related point. Markets for technology
may reduce the importance of technology as a source of competitive advan-
tages. The point is not that technological superiority in chemical processing
is unimportant. Technologically less sophisticated chemical companies (such
as those in the developing countries) were likely to be less effective in taking
advantage of the SEF technologies and gaps between technologically
advanced and less advanced firms (or countries) did not disappear. However,
the presence of the SEFs meant that this gap was reduced and the entry by
newcomer chemical firms with no significant technological expertise became
possible. Thus many firms have exited products which they innovated and in
which they have had a great deal of experience in production.21
19 Partly as a consequence, the share of industrialized countries in world chemical production has fallen
dramatically from 85.7% in 1954 to 62.1% in 1994. This is not simply a reflection of economic growth
elsewhere. The share of industrialized countries in world exports of chemicals has fallen from over 97% in
1955 to less than 67% in 1993 (Eichengreen, 1998).
20 The pattern just described is not different in several high-tech industries today. Specialized suppliers
in biotechnology, software or semiconductors accrue typical advantages of specialization in their areas of
technological expertise. Moreover, while many of these specialized technology suppliers originated in the
USA and they are still largely US based, their services and technology are available to European and
Japanese companies as well, which have entered into a number of licensing agreements and other types of
alliances with US technology-based firms.
21 For instance, ICI, which first commercialized polyethylene and polyester, has virtually exited from
these markets (Arora and Gambardella, 1998).
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for technology is that firms have to cut costs, possibly by exiting businesses
in which they lack a clear source of advantage. To the extent that technology
becomes a relatively less important source of competitive advantages, another
response is that firms have to look for other distinctive competitive assets.22
Indeed, as we discussed in Section 3.1, the resource-based theory of the firm
argues that a competitive advantage is sustainable only if it is underpinned
by resources and capabilities which are scarce and imperfectly mobile. This is
for instance why detailed knowledge of the specificities of demand can
become increasingly important. In turn this means that companies should
focus on knowledge and information about the local geographic markets in
which they operate or about the peculiar and diverse demands of their clients
and users. And they have to make significant investments in capturing
information about customer needs or the special requirements of their local
markets (Porter, 1998).
The heterogeneity of demand is a potential source of distinctive capabil-
ities (Teece et al., 1997). In the first place, demand heterogeneity implies that
companies can extract greater value from their customers by specifying
products or services that better suit their special requirements. At the same
time, customers are often unable to articulate their needs in ways that can be
readily transferred to the producing firms. As a result, this information can
only be acquired through close relationships with them. Put simply, while
knowledge about basic technologies could circulate to a greater extent, the
tacit component of the knowledge bases in industry may shift towards
information and expertise about what the individual customers want (von
Hippel, 1998). This information is less tradable and therefore it is likely to
become a prominent source of competitive advantages. In short, with markets
for technology companies could take advantage of the lower cost of acquiring
technologies and focus on a combination of internal and external technologies
to provide distinct solutions to their markets, customers and users. This has
to be based on a solid understanding of their needs, along with substantial
investments in relationships with their customers and markets.23
The dynamic response rests on the recognition that in a rapidly moving
22 For example, since the 1950s the chemical companies have paid significant attention to product
differentiation by developing a range of different grades of their materials to suit the specific requirements
of different markets or users. Similarly, control of the production of basic feedstock, through direct
investments in oil producing countries, has been for many years a relatively more important source of
competitive advantages than technology for the leading oil and petrochemical manufacturers.
23 Porter (1998) argues that, apart from the customers, companies should make substantial investments
in developing tight linkages with the wide set of resources and infrastructures of the individual regions in
which they operate commercially.
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company is unlikely to persist for a long time. Thus firms have to learn how
to manage themselves in an environment in which the rate of innovation is
high, competition is more intense and the time to market new products has
to be shorter. Dynamic competitive advantages imply that companies have to
learn how to reorganize themselves rapidly and continuously deploy new
competitive advantages and distinctive assets. Specifically, as markets for
technology develop, technological superiority is increasingly going to be
meaningless if intended as a long-term advantage from controlling a given set
of technologies. In contrast, it can become a critical source of distinctive assets
if the company is capable of accumulating technological capabilities in a
certain domain and continuously develop new technologies in that field by
building on cumulative expertise in that area. Moreover, markets for tech-
nology could further enhance the returns on these capabilities, as companies
may become leading suppliers in these markets as well.
8. Conclusions
There is growing evidence that trade in technology has become an important
phenomenon in recent years. This paper has analyzed how markets for
technology affect and condition technology strategies of companies, both as
technology users and as technology suppliers. In the former case, as far as it
concerns large technology-based firms, the first and most obvious implication
is that markets for technology increase the strategy space and firms can
choose to license their technology rather than only rely on internal exploita-
tion. The licensing decision is driven by the interplay of the profit dissipation
effect from licensing which comes through increased competition and the
revenue effect from licensing which is due to the pecuniary compensation paid
by the licensee for access to the technology. Accordingly, licensing is more
likely to be chosen in a distant market (where it is costly to produce), when
the market share of the licensor is small (e.g. ‘orphan’ technologies) and when
the downstream market is highly competitive (as profit dissipation from an
additional player is small). In addition, markets for technology prompt
effective internal management and organization of companies’ intellectual
property.
For small firms and technology-based start-ups markets for technology
increase the effectiveness of strategies based on the specialization of such firms
in technology development. They do not need to incur costly and risky invest-
ments in downstream assets and can profit from their research even if they
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developed.
Since markets for technology also involve firms as technology buyers, the
growth of such markets increases the importance of external monitoring of
technological developments and it increases the penalty of insularity and the
‘not invented here’ syndrome. Markets for technology can also reduce the
relative importance of technology as a source of distinctive advantage, because
the advantage of possessing some critical knowledge or technology may be
limited by the ability of competitors to acquire the technology from other
sources. The natural consequence is that companies have to focus on other
internal assets that may provide them with distinctive advantages. Detailed
knowledge and information about the idiosyncratic needs and characteristics
of specific markets and buyers is an obvious candidate. Thus markets for
technology may actually increase the importance of downstream strategies for
differentiation. At an industry level markets for technology lower entry
barriers, increase competition and compress product life cycles: all changes
that require appropriate strategic responses.
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